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THE DIVISIBILITY OF PENSION INTERESTS
ON DIVORCE: THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA UPS THE ANTE
The District of Columbia Code provides a statutory scheme for the dis-
tribution of marital property upon the entry of a final divorce decree.' Ab-
sent a valid antenuptial or post-nuptial agreement, all property acquired
during coverture, except that acquired by gift, inheritance, bequest or de-
vise, is subject to equitable distribution.2 The loose framework of the eq-
uitable distribution statute has provided the District of Columbia courts
with considerable discretion in apportioning marital property. This discre-
tionary power, however, is not without cost. The statute's lack of specific-
ity leads to speculation on whether certain items, particularly unvested
interests in intangible assets, should be included among the property to be
distributed.3 The apportionment problem becomes particularly difficult in
i. Section 16-910 of the District of Columbia Code provides:
Upon the entry of a final decree of annulment or divorce in the absence of a
valid antenuptial or post-nuptial agreement or a decree of legal separation dispos-
ing the property of the spouses, the court shall:
(a) assign to each party his or her sole and separate property acquired prior to
the marriage, and his or her sole and separate property acquired during the mar-
riage by gift, bequest, devise or descent, and any increase thereof, or property ac-
quired in exchange therefore; and
(b) distribute all other property accumulated during the marriage, regardless of
whether title is held individually or by the parties in a form of joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entireties, in a manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, after
considering all relevant factors including but not limited to: the duration of the
marriage, any prior marriage of either party, the age, health, occupation, amount
and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, assets, debts, and needs of
each of the parties, provisions for the custody of minor children, whether the distri-
bution is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for
future acquisition of assets and income. The court shall also consider each party's
contribution to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, dissipation, or deprecia-
tion in value of the assets subject to distribution under this subsection, and each
party's contribution as a homemaker or to the family unit.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981).
2. Id. Although the present statute makes no distinction between sole and concurrent
ownership of property, its predecessor did. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1973). The stat-
utory change was designed to facilitate an equitable result in divorce property dispositions
without requiring the court to search for strict legal or equitable ownership interests in the
nontitled spouse. See Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. 1979).
3. The goal of a property distribution is to equitably divide between the spouses the
property acquired during the marriage with marital funds and efforts. See supra note 1. An
unvested interest in an intangible asset, such as a pension interest, becomes problematic
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the distribution of pensions because such interests often do not have defi-
nite values at the time of the divorce decree.4 The difficulty in apportion-
ment is compounded by consideration of whether property rights exist in
the unvested interest,5 and if they are found to exist, what role conditions
precedent to the receipt of the benefits play in determining their
valuation.6
In two recent cases, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has of-
fered guidelines for the application of the District of Columbia's equitable
distribution statute to the apportionment of pension interests. In Barbour
v. Barbour,7 the court dealt with the threshold question of whether a Fed-
eral Civil Service pension interest was "property" subject to equitable dis-
tribution in a divorce proceeding. Barbour involved a divorce in which
both spouses were participants in the Federal Civil Service Retirement
Plan.8 At the time of the entry of the divorce decree, the husband's pen-
sion had been vested for ten years while the wife's pension had not yet
vested.9 During the course of the marriage, the wife had been responsible
for all household chores as well as child care. She also had held part-time
jobs outside the home. At the time of trial, the wife was providing full or
partial financial support for six children and five grandchildren, while the
husband was in default on child support and maintenance payments.'
Based on the disparate obligations of the parties, the trial court awarded
the wife a portion of the husband's pension benefits." It further deter-
mined that under no condition was the husband to receive any portion of
because benefits accrue to an account before rights to the benefits arise. For a general dis-
cussion of the inclusion of marital property under equitable distribution statutes, see I. BAX-
TER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 11:2 (Supp. 1983).
4. Since there is no right in the pension interest, and many contingencies such as
death, termination, and disability are present prior to the enjoyment of rights, the interest is
difficult to value. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
5. It has been held that the holder of an unvested interest in a pension has no rights in
the accrued benefits as long as the plan administrators have not breached their fiduciary
duty. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
6. See supra note 4; infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
7. 464 A.2d 915 (D.C. 1983).
8. The Federal Civil Service Retirement Plan was developed as a result of the Civil
Service Retirement Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8348 (1982). The plan is funded by obligatory
employee contributions based upon the employee's wage rate. 5 U.S.C. § 8334 (1982).
9. Barbour, 464 A.2d at 917. For a discussion of the concept of vesting and its impor-
tance to the divisibility of pension interests, see infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
10. 464 A.2d at 917. The factual circumstances presented in Barbour are of the very
type that the District of Columbia Council, in promulgating the equitable distribution stat-
ute, wished the court to consider in effecting a just and reasonable property distribution. See
supra note 1.
11. 464 A.2d at 917.
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the wife's pension benefits. 12
On appeal, the husband challenged the trial court's decree on two legal
theories. First, the husband argued that the trial court misconstrued the
equitable distribution statute. 3 Second, the husband charged that the trial
court had abused its discretion when it disallowed him a portion of his
wife's pension. 4 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected
these arguments. It reasoned that pension benefits were inextricably
bound to the modem employment relationship, and pensions were similar
in nature to other deferred income assets. 5 Thus, the court held that the
inclusion of the pension interest as marital property was proper in light of
the broad application to be afforded the equitable distribution statute. 16
Additionally, the court held that the exclusion of the wife's pension bene-
fits from the divisible marital property was within the scope of the trial
court's discretion to effect a just and reasonable result."'
In the companion case of McCree v. McCree, " the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals dealt with the question of retroactive application of the
equitable distribution statute. During his marriage, the husband in
MeCree had been employed by the federal government for thirty-five
years.' 9 After separating from his wife, but prior to the entry of a final
divorce decree, the husband retired.2" Upon retirement, a federal pension
became the sole source of the estranged husband's income.2' In applying
12. Id Contrary to the husband's assertion, the trial court did not treat the wife's pen-
sion as separate property by excluding it from the marital estate. It merely declined to di-
vide this interest. Id at 921-22.
13. Id at 918. The thrust of the husband's argument was that since the equitable distri-
bution statute did not refer specifically to pensions, the statutory term "property" could not
be broadened by judicial construction to include pensions. Id
14. See supra note 12. An extended discussion of abuse of discretion is beyond the
scope of this Note. It is sufficient to state that the notion of what constitutes abuse of discre-
tion in a court's apportionment of marital property is well-settled in the District of Colum-
bia. As long as the trial court's determination was based on the totality of the circumstances,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals will not disturb the trial court's decision. There is
no requirement that the property be divided equally. For an excellent discussion on the
present equitable distribution statute and the discretion afforded the District of Columbia
Superior Court in the distribution of marital property, see Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139
(D.C. 1979).
15. Barbour, 464 A.2d at 920. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
16. 464 A.2d at 919.
17. Id. at 922. See supra notes 12, 14.
18. 464 A.2d 922 (D.C. 1983).
19. Id at 925.
20. Id The couple separated in November, 1978. McCree retired in November, 1980,
prior to the a vinculo decree which was issued September 1981. Id
21. Although the wife had no pension of her own, she eventually may become eligible
for modest social security benefits. Id In addition, the trial court found that the wife suf-
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the equitable distribution statute, the trial court apportioned the benefits
due under the husband's pension.22 He challenged this distribution argu-
ing that, since most of the rights to the benefits had accrued before the
statute's effective date,2 3 the division of these benefits amounted to an un-
constitutional "taking" of property without due process of law.24 The
court of appeals affirmed reasoning that, because the equitable distribution
statute was aimed at property divisions which would occur after its effec-
tive date, the statute's application was intended to be prospective only.25
Further, the court emphasized the important state interest in assuring a
reasonable allocation of property for the protection of both spouses.26
This Note will examine the propriety of regarding pension interests as
marital property subject to the District of Columbia's equitable distribu-
tion statute. Distinctions will be drawn between vested and unvested pen-
sion interests regarding the congruity of those interests with traditional
notions of property. This Note also will discuss the due process concerns
caused by retroactive application of the equitable distribution statute to
accrued pension benefits. Finally, it will assess methods of valuation and
apportionment of the pension interest. The Note will conclude that if flex-
ible methods of valuation and apportionment are employed, retroactive
statutory application to vested pension interests does not violate due pro-
cess and is inherently fair to both spouses. Unvested pension interests,
however, should not be included in divisible marital property in the inter-
ests of preserving traditional property precepts and the reasonable expecta-
tions of the spouses.
fered from serious physical and emotional problems which required professional attention
on a regular basis. Id
22. McCree, 464 A.2d at 925.
23. The effective date of the District of Columbia's equitable distribution statute was
April 7, 1977. D.C. Law 1-107, tit. i, § 107, 23 D.C.R. 8737 (1977). The pension interest in
McCree had fully vested many years before that date. Additionally, most of the benefits had
accrued prior to the effective date. McCree, 464 A.2d at 925.
24. McCree, 464 A.2d at 924. Because his interest in the pension had totally vested
prior to the effective date of the statute and his benefits were almost entirely accrued, Mc-
Cree claimed that the distribution constituted a "taking" of property without due process of
law in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1. Unlike the petitioning husband in Barbour, Mc-
Cree did not contest the characterization of his interest as marital property. Indeed, such a
characterization was necessary to McCree's due process argument, which, by definition, re-
quired that the interest being "taken" was property. The majority of the courts that have
considered whether a vested and matured pension right was apportionable as marital prop-
erty have held such an interest to be includable in the marital estate. See generally Annot.,
94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
25. McCree, 464 A.2d at 926-27.
26. Id. at 928.
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I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENSION INTEREST AS
MARITAL PROPERTY
4. Vesting
Judicial decisions determining the divisibility of rights in a pension plan
have focused on the level of vesting of the pension interest in deciding
whether to include it in marital property.27 Accrued pension benefits 28 fall
into one of three broad categories. The interest may be vested and ma-
tured, vested but not matured, or unvested. If the pension interest is vested
and matured, an unconditional right to immediate payment exists. 29 If the
interest is vested but not matured, the interest survives discharge or volun-
tary termination of the employment relationship before retirement.3" If,
however, the interest is unvested, it is completely forfeited upon termina-
tion of the employment relationship. 3'
Of the three pension interests, a vested and matured interest is most
closely related to the traditional notion of property.32 Interests of this type
are immediately payable, the pension-earner exercises a great deal of con-
trol over the benefits, and the value of the benefits is easily ascertainable.33
Similarly, vested but not matured benefits are also readily characterized as
property. Such benefits are necessarily payable at some future date and
their value may be adequately estimated.34 Judicially protected rights ex-
ist in the pension-earner concerning the plan's administration, and indeed,
27. See Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176, § 13 (Supp. 1983).
28. The concept of accrual of benefits under a plan is quite different from the concept of
vesting. Benefits begin to accrue prior to vesting. The amount of accrued benefits is deter-
mined by the wage and the length of the employee's service. Accrued benefits are those
benefits chargeable against the plan only if the conditions precedent to the receipt of the
benefits are fulfilled. The accrual of benefits is determinative of the amount of the pension
to be received, while vesting is determinative of the rights of the employee to the benefits
accrued. See generally J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, JR., PENSION PLANNING 54 (1972).
29. See 1. BAXTER, supra note 3, at § 11:2(a).
30. Id. Although an interest may be vested, it may be subject to conditions precedent.
For example, payment may be conditioned upon survival of the employee to retirement age.
It is the conditioning of payment that distinguishes a vested but not matured pension interest
from an interest which is both vested and matured. Id
31. Id.
32. Traditional property concepts commonly include the unrestricted right to use a
thing, to exclude anyone else from its use, and to dispose of it in every legal way. See
generallyT. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS
(1966); see also infra note 123.
33. Based upon the amount of the accrued benefits, the contractual provisions of the
plan, and the time-value of money, a matured right is easily valued.
34. Based upon the actuarial expectancy to survive until retirement age and the pro-
jected increase of pension plan funds, the vested interest is more readily estimable than the
unvested interest since the possibility of losing the right to receive the interest because of
employment termination is not present. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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most courts consider the vested but not matured right to be marital prop-
erty subject to distribution on divorce.3 1 Unvested pension interests, how-
ever, bear the least resemblance to traditional property concepts.
Although the benefits have accrued to the potential pensioner's account,
the right to receive those benefits is conditional. It has been held that the
pension-earner has no right to the accrued benefits if employment was ter-
minated at the very brink of total vesting.36 Thus, courts have had the
greatest conceptual difficulty in categorizing an unvested pension interest
as property belonging in the marital estate, as is evidenced by the disparate
positions taken by the various jurisdictions deciding the issue.37
B. Dividing Unvested Interests: Brown and its Aftermath
The inclusion of unvested pension interests in the marital estate was first
addressed by the community property states.38 In French v. French,39 the
Supreme Court of California found that an unvested pension interest was
not property and, therefore, was not a community asset subject to division.
35. See cases collected in Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
36. In Swaida v. IBM, 570 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd, 728 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1984), the tentativeness of the unvested interest is exhibited. In Swaida, an employee with
an unvested interest in a plan with ten-year cliff vesting was found to have no right to his
accrued benefits when he was discharged nine years, nine months and twenty-one days after
he was hired. "Cliff-vesting" is a method of vesting whereby until a certain date, the em-
ployee has no vested right in the plan, but on that date, the employee becomes 100% vested.
Id. at 484. IBM structured its plan under the "elapsed-time method" of measuring years of
service for its salaried employees. This method measures the time elapsed between two
dates-the date of hire and the date of termination. In contrast, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) provides that years of service may be measured in terms of
hours worked per year. ERISA § 203(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(2)(A) (1982). If the
employee puts in at least 1000 hours of service during the year, this is sufficient to constitute
a year of service. Swaida worked over 1000 hours in the tenth year, but because IBM mea-
sured years of service under the elapsed-time method, his benefits did not vest. Thus, the
action was dismissed on summary judgment. Swaida, 570 F. Supp. at 490.
37. See Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383 (Del. 1981); Re Marriage of Evans, 85
Ill. 2d 523, 426 N.E.2d 854 (1981); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981); Re
Marriage of Rogers, 45 Or. App. 885, 609 P.2d 877, modrfled, 47 Or. App. 963, 615 P.2d 412
(1980); Re Marriage of Camarata, 43 Colo. App. 317, 602 P.2d 907 (1979); Goodwill v.
Goodwill, 178 Ind. App. 372, 382 N.E.2d 720 (1978) (en banc). Since the equitable distribu-
tion statute involves property only, the unvested pension interest must first be classified as
such before the statute will apply.
38. This is probably because before the common law states adopted equitable distribu-
tion statutes, they placed considerable emphasis on title in a property division. Title, how-
ever, was of little importance in the community property states. With the advent of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and the general realization of the inequitable results
yielded by the title-based distinction, the question of which party held legal title was no
longer regarded as a primary consideration in equitable distribution of property upon disso-
lution of a marriage. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307, 9A U.L.A. 142 (1979).
39. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
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Instead, the French court classified unvested pension interests as mere ex-
pectancies reasoning that, since the existence of a future benefit under the
plan is dependent on the continued existence of the employment relation-
ship, which is quite tentative, the interest cannot be construed as
property. n
Thirty-five years later, however, French was overruled by the landmark
case of Marriage of Brown.4 ' The Supreme Court of California held that
an unvested interest extended beyond the mere expectancy limit enunci-
ated in French.41 Specifically, the Brown court held that an unvested inter-
est was a contingent interest that formed part of the consideration of an
employment contract.43 It reasoned that the realities of modern employ-
ment made the pension a bargained-for part of the compensation package
instead of a mere gratuity.44 Thus, the right was basically contractual, and
since a contract right is a property right, there should be a division upon
divorce.45 California's lead was soon followed by most of the other com-
46munity property states.
Before Brown, states retaining common law property concepts uniformly
held that unvested pension interests were not divisible.4 7 The decision in
Brown, however, formed the impetus for many states to reevaluate their
previous positions concerning such interests. This reevaluation has pro-
duced at least three different stands on the issue: 1) adoption of the ap-
proach set forth in Brown;48 2) consideration of the unvested pension
interests as one factor in determining financial distribution, although not
including the pension in the division;49 and 3) total disregard of the pen-
sion interest because of an inability to evaluate its worth, due to a lack of
40. Id. at 778, 112 P.2d at 236-37.
41. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
42. Id. at 841, 544 P.2d at 562, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
43. Id at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, 599 P.2d 1004 (1979) (unvested pension interest is a
contingent community interest divisible by the court); Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272,
569 P.2d 214 (1977) (divisible property right in unvested pension attributable to community
efforts); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976) (pension is deferred compensation,
and even though unvested, may be divided to the extent earned during marriage); Wilder v.
Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975) (unvested pension plan divisible at divorce).
It may, however, be technically inaccurate to say the community property states followed
California's lead, given that Washington was the first state to hold that unvested pension
benefits were divisible marital property. See DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491
P.2d 249 (1971).
47. See Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
48. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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vesting.50
In Robert C.S v. Barbara JS,5 the Supreme Court of Delaware relied
upon Brown and upheld a trial court apportionment of the husband's un-
vested union pension.52 The court held that the nature of the pension as
vested or unvested was not a controlling factor under the state's equitable
distribution statute. 3 It reasoned that modem employment had trans-
formed the pension interest into present consideration for employment
with enjoyment postponed until some future date.54 When viewed as pres-
ent consideration, it follows that the pension interest is divisible, although
not currently vested.55 The court stated, however, that the likelihood of
eventual payment must be considered in the distribution.56
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Deering v. Deering,57
found that the husband's federal civil service pension fell within the scope
of the state's equitable distribution statute. Although the pension interest
in Deering was vested but not matured, the court held that its decision
applied to all pension interests regardless of vesting.58 In the court's view,
concern with vesting clouded the issues of divisibility.59 Since the Mary-
land statute did not mention the level of vesting of a property interest, the
court reasoned that an unvested interest can be divided as long as it is
property. 60 Because of the broad powers conferred upon the courts con-
cerning property distribution in divorce, the Deering court concluded that
exclusion of unvested pension interests would be contrary to legislative
intent.6'
A second, less liberal approach has been taken by a large number of
courts which, although not including the pension in the marital estate,
have considered the issue of divisibility of an unvested pension interest on
divorce. In Goodwill v. Goodwill,62 the Court of Appeals of Indiana re-
versed a trial court's award of a portion of the husband's unvested pension
to the wife. The court held that while it was permissible to treat a pension
plan as a factor in determining the financial aspects of a divorce, the trial
50. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
51. 434 A.2d 383 (Del. 1981).
52. Id. at 387.
53. Id
54. Id at 386.
55. Id at 387.
56. Id at 388.
57. 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981).
58. Id at 128, 437 A.2d at 889.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 125, 437 A.2d at 887.
61. Id.
62. 178 Ind. App. 372, 382 N.E.2d 720 (1978) (en banc).
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court had abused its discretion in awarding a portion of the unvested pen-
sion to the wife.6 3 The Goodwill court reasoned that if the pension-earner
did not have a present, vested interest in the future payments, inclusion of
the interest as property held by the couple would strain the meaning of
property.64 The court further reasoned that distribution of property that
may never become payable would be fundamentally unfair.6 5
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Oregon, in Roth v. Roth,6 6 determined
that the husband's unvested pension interest could not be divided by the
trial court when permanent alimony had been granted to the nonearning
spouse.67 In the court's view, this essentially would result in a double dis-
tribution since the alimony would be derived from the pension.68 The
same Oregon court later reasoned, in Rogers v. Rogers,69 that a pension
interest, whether or not vested, is not per se marital property capable of
division.7" Contingencies inherent in the particular plan may decrease the
likelihood of its being property.7 The clear tenor of the opinion is that
when a pension interest is unvested, it should not be included because of
the tenuous nature of the interest.
The third approach to the characterization of the unvested pension in-
terest excludes that interest from marital property because of the difficulty
in ascertaining its monetary value. In Marriage of Evans,72 the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that when there was insufficient evidence to establish
a value for unvested benefits, those benefits should not be considered in
the division of property on divorce." The court reasoned that if the re-
ceipt of benefits is conditioned on future events, these events must be taken
into account in determining the value of the interest.74 While some specu-
lation is tolerable, the Evans court suggested that the more one must specu-
late, the less likely the interest is property for purposes of distribution.75
The court implied that in instances where the benefits are subject to forfei-
ture upon death or termination of employment, a valuation problem nec-
63. Id. at 376, 382 N.E.2d at 723.
64. Id at 375, 382 N.E.2d at 723.
65. Id.
66. 31 Or. App. 65, 569 P.2d 693 (1977).
67. Id. at 69, 569 P.2d at 695.
68. Id.
69. 45 Or. App. 885, 609 P.2d 877, modified, 47 Or. App. 963, 615 P.2d 412, reh. denied,
289 Or. 659 (1980), modified, 50 Or. App. 511,623 P.2d 1108, reh. denied, 290 Or. 853 (1981).
70. Id at 893, 609 P.2d at 881.
71. Id. at 892, 609 P.2d at 881.
72. 85 I11. 2d 523, 426 N.E.2d 854 (1981).
73. Id. at 529, 426 N.E.2d at 859.
74. Id. at 528, 426 N.E.2d at 857.
75. Id.
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essarily exists, and thus such unvested interests should not be divided.76
The Court of Appeals of Colorado took a similar approach in Marriage
of Camarata.77 It refused to consider the interest of a husband in a pen-
sion plan as part of the marital estate, even when that interest had reached
pay-status.78 The Camarata court reasoned that since the benefits had no
cash surrender value, loan value, redemption value, lump sum value, or
value realizable after death, the benefits should not be considered in the
property settlement.79 Including such benefits would, in the court's view,
be giving the title of property to an interest devoid of many of the classic
attributes of property.8°
II. APPLICATION OF THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STATUTE
A. Nature of the District of Columbia Statute
In the District of Columbia, prior to the enactment in 1977 of the cur-
rent property distribution statute, the title to property was a major concern
in apportioning the marital estate.8 ' Because title-based apportionment
was insensitive to the real expectations of the spouses, the statute was
amended to make title to property irrelevant.82 The new statute is repre-
sentative of the equitable distribution statutes in effect in most other com-
mon law jurisdictions. No limits are placed on the types of property that
may be divided, so long as the property was acquired during coverture and
was not acquired by gift, inheritance, bequest or devise. 3
In Hemily v. Hemiy,84 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals con-
strued the intent and reach of the equitable distribution statute soon after
its enactment. The court held that, given the nature of the marriage rela-
tionship, each spouse would reasonably expect an interest in all property
acquired during the marriage.8" In Hemily, the parties to the divorce had
purchased two identical adjoining houses during their marriage. Although
the title of both properties was originally in the husband alone, the title to
one house was subsequently transferred by the husband to the wife during
marriage. The husband, however, continued to make the mortgage pay-
76. Id. at 531, 426 N.E.2d at 858.
77. 43 Colo. App. 317, 602 P.2d 907 (1979).




81. See supra note 2.
82. Id.
83. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981), supra note 1.
84. 403 A.2d 1139 (D.C. 1979).
85. Id at 1142.
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ments on both properties. The trial judge applied the equitable distribu-
tion statute and awarded each spouse sole ownership of one house. 6 The
wife challenged the court's ruling, claiming that under the equitable distri-
bution statute, the transfer to her of title was a gift. She asserted that this
was, therefore, her sole property and not subject to consideration in the
property division. The wife did, however, claim an interest in the other
house.8 7 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's award. While
acknowledging there was superficial support for the wife's argument in the
wording of the statute, the appellate court held that the statute barred only
property that the other spouse would not reasonably expect to be property
includable in the marital estate.8" The "gift" claimed by the wife was
purchased with and maintained by marital funds. Thus, it was reasonable
for the wife to expect that both houses would fall into the marital estate for
the purpose of property distribution upon divorce.8 9
In Murville v. Murville,90 the court of appeals further construed the equi-
table distribution statute. Following a divorce granted on the grounds of
voluntary separation, the husband was granted the lion's share of the mari-
tal property in the property distribution. The wife appealed on the ground
that the trial court had abused its discretion in barring cross-examination
based on the issue of the husband's adultery. 9' In affirming, the court of
appeals noted that, although an inquiry as to fault in the breakdown of the
marriage is not required by the equitable distribution statute, if alleged in
a timely fashion, fault may be considered by the trial court as a relevant
factor in distributing property.92 The court further held that a property
distribution need not be equal, only equitable.93
In sum, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in resolving contro-
versies concerning the equitable distribution statute, has favored a broad
inclusion of property among the assets to be distributed upon dissolution
of a marriage.94
86. Id at 1140.
87. Id at 1141.
88. Id. at 1142.
89. Id at 1143.
90. 433 A.2d 1106 (D.C. 1981).
91. Id at 1108.
92. Id at 1109.
93. Id at 1110.
94. See, e.g., Broadwater v. Broadwater, 449 A.2d 286 (D.C. 1982) (trial judge has
broad discretion concerning assets to be distributed); Turpin v. Turpin, 403 A.2d 1144 (D.C.
1979) (monetary contributions to property not determinative in property distribution).
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B. Retroactive Application of the Statute
Because of the enactment of equitable distribution statutes in many
common law property jurisdictions, the application of such statutes to
property held by the titled spouse prior to the statutes' effective dates occa-
sionally has been challenged as violative of due process.95 The substance
of such a challenge is that, by applying the statute to property that previ-
ously was held individually, thereby making that property part of the mar-
ital estate, the statute operates as a retroactive deprivation of property.
This challenge raises the question of whether the legislature may constitu-
tionally affect property rights. That it may do so through the exercise of its
police power is well settled.
A state is vested with police power authorizing it to limit the use of
property so that it may effect desirable societal goals.96 In Nebbia v. New
York,97 the United States Supreme Court upheld a state statute setting the
minimum prices for the retail sale of milk.98 The petitioners argued that
the milk industry was not imbued with the public interest, and thus was
not a proper target for the police power.99 Noting that property rights are
not absolute, o the Nebbia Court held that it was proper for the legislature
to limit petitioner's property by setting prices."' It held that due process
merely required that the legislative enactment not be unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious.' °2 The impact of Nebbia is that as long as the legisla-
ture operates within these constitutional guidelines, it may affect property
rights in any area to advance social goals.
Two recent state court decisions are directly on point. In Kujawinski v.
95. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). In Munn, the United States Supreme
Court upheld an Illinois statute regulating the storage price of grain against the petitioner's
challenge that the regulation impaired their business by reducing established prices. Find-
ing the grain industry imbued with the public interest, the Court held that such regulation
was a proper exercise of the state's police power. Further, the Court held that the property
could reasonably be impaired because its ownership is grounded within the ambit of legisla-
tive authority. Id. at 133.
97. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
98. Id. at 516.
99. Id. at 523.
100. Id. at 523. The Court held:
[N]either property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot
exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with
the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
Id
101. Id. at 539.
102. Id at 525.
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Kujawinski,1°3 the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the constitutionality
of that state's equitable distribution statute when applied to property ac-
quired before the statute's effective date.'" First, the court found that
there had never been an absolute right to the property because the Illinois
courts had the power to divest a spouse of property under the former stat-
ute. 10 5 Second, the court held that the statute did not per se take property
from a spouse, but merely prescribed procedures to be followed in the
event of a divorce.'° 6 Finally, the court held that it was in the interest of
the state to slightly impair the spouse's already qualified property right to
insure that the nontitled spouse will not become a ward of the state.
0 7
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Bacchetta v.
Bacchetta,0 8 found that the state's equitable distribution statute did not
run afoul of the due process clause when applied to property obtained
prior to the date the statute took effect.' 09 Finding that the legislative exer-
cise was reasonable, the Bacchetta court held that this property was af-
fected only upon divorce, only when justified by considerations of need
and contribution, and only in amounts justified by the facts." 0
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BARBOUR AND MCCREE
A. The Divisibility of Pension Interests
The Barbour court answered the question of whether a vested but not
matured pension interest was marital property in the affirmative."' Bar-
bour is notable because the District of Columbia Court of Appeals went
beyond the scope of the issue presented and announced that the equitable
distribution statute also embraced unvested pension interests.112
The court initially addressed the critical question of whether a pension
interest could realistically be called "property." ' 13 It noted that a pension
103. 71 111. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
104. Id. at 575, 376 N.E.2d at 1385.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Id at 577, 376 N.E.2d at 1387.
108. 498 Pa. 227, 445 A.2d 1194 (1982).
109. Id at 234, 445 A.2d at 1197.
110. Id. at 235, 445 A.2d at 1198.
Ill. Barbour, 464 A.2d at 919. The court followed the rationale developed by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in Deering. The Deering approach held that every pension interest
was marital property, but that the contingency of the interest should be considered in the
valuation of the property. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 120, 437 A.2d 883, 889 (1981). See supra
notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
112. Barbour, 464 A.2d at 919-20 n.6.
113. Id. at 919. See supra note 32, infra note 122-23.
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is an integral part of an employee's compensation package and represents
deferred income." 4 This compensation, if received contemporaneously
with the employment services rendered, could have been used to purchase
other types of deferred-income assets, which would become divisible mari-
tal property in the event of a divorce." 5 The Barbour court reasoned that
the parties' expectation of future income from a retirement plan did not
hinge on whether the plan took the form of a pension or another type of
deferred-income investment." 6 Thus, the court could find no reasonable
basis for including deferred-income assets as marital property while ex-
cluding unvested pension benefits. Further, since the equitable distribu-
tion statute authorized the trial court to distribute "all" property without
defining the term "property," the court construed the statutory term "prop-
erty" to include pension interests without regard to the level of vesting." 7
When applied to vested pension benefits, the Barbour court's logic is
unassailable. When extended to include unvested pension benefits, how-
ever, it arguably becomes unsound. First, a deferred-income investment is
purchased with the employee's own funds. Any interest an employee
purchases, whether in the form of a contributory pension or an individual
retirement account, is always a vested interest." 8 Further, a purchased de-
ferred-income asset carries with it a right to immediate control."19 Thus,
even though pensions and deferred-income assets are used to effect the
114. Barbour, 464 A.2d at 920.
115. Id
116. Id.
117. Id. at 919. See supra note I.
118. Section 411 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that all employee contributions
to a pension plan are nonforfeitable and are fully vested if the accrued benefits are derived
from such contributions. Such is obviously the case with deferred-income assets purchased
with the employee's own funds. However, the employer who provides a noncontributory
pension plan is not similarly bound to offer employees immediate vesting in their accrued
benefits. See generally I.R.C. § 411 (1982). Additionally, in the event of the death of the
contributor before age 59 1/2, the estate recaptures the investment without the 10% tax pen-
alty. In an unvested pension plan, there is no right to pension benefits if one does not
survive the time of vesting. Finally, in a tax-deferred annuity situation, pursuant to § 403 of
the Internal Revenue Code, early recapture of the benefit is also possible. I.R.C. § 403
(1982). There can be no early recapture in an unvested pension setting, because there was
never an absolute right to the property.
119. Although tax liability may be increased substantially, the investor will be able to
control the capital he initially invested in an individual retirement account. See I.R.C. § 408
(1982). Additionally, in the event of the death of the contributor before age 59 14, the estate
recaptures the investment without the 10% tax penalty. In an unvested pension plan, there is
no right to pension benefits if one does not survive the time of vesting. Finally, in a tax-
deferred annuity situation, pursuant to § 403 of the Internal Revenue Code, early recapture
of the benefit is also possible. I.R.C. § 403 (1982). There can be no early recapture in an
unvested pension setting, because there was never an absolute right to the property.
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same goals, they are in fact very different creatures. An unvested pension
benefit is subject to involuntary forfeiture at the whim of the employer.
The same is plainly untrue of vested property interests.
Moreover, characterization of unvested pension benefits as "property,"
based on the absence of a statutory definition of the term and its use in
conjunction with the word "all," is disingenuous. When the legislature
fails to define a term, the word is presumed to encompass only the conven-
tional definition. 2 ' As Dean Cribbet has noted, "[P]roperty is a concept,
separate and apart from the thing. Property consists, in fact, of the legal
relations among people in regard to a thing."'' In this context, an un-
vested pension interest bears little resemblance to property. 122 An em-
ployee has no right to accrued benefits under a pension plan if his interest
is unvested and his employer has complied with the applicable laws.
23
120. This proposition is supported by the United States Supreme Court as well as Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals decisions. Eg., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (starting point in construing a statute is its language, which is assumed to
embrace only the ordinary meaning of the words); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981)
(starting point in every case involving statutory construction is the plain language of the
statute); McMullen v. Police and Firefighter's Retirement and Relief Bd., 465 A.2d 364, 366
(D.C. 1983) (great weight should be given the reasonable construction of the statute); United
States v. Stokes, 365 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 1976) (court is not empowered to look beyond the
plain meaning of the statute's language).
121. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2 (1975).
122. See supra note 32. Some writers avoid the traditional notions of property by sug-
gesting that pension interests are "new property." The "new property" concept, posited by
Professor Charles A. Reich, is more concerned with status than with traditional rights of
ownership. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). This theory is based on the
premise that government plays an extensive role in every aspect of modern life. This role is
comprised largely of grants of status to its citizens, such as licenses, permits, welfare, and
social insurance. These objects of status, Reich submits, have become substitutes for tradi-
tional wealth. Id at 739. One student author concluded that the "new property" concept
had "particular force" when applied to pension interests because they are "substitutes for
and defer receipt of wages presently earned." Note, The Pension Expectation as Constitu-
tional Property, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 167 (1980).
123. See supra note 36. In this regard, it is important to note that since the employee
may be denied any future use of the funds before they become vested, the unvested interest
lacks one of the most essential elements of property. AccordDickman v. Commissioner, 104
S. Ct. 1086, 1090 (1984). In his opinion for the majority in Dickman, Chief Justice Burger
maintained:
Of the aggregate rights associated with any property interest, the right of use of
property is perhaps of the highest order. One court put it succinctly: "'Property' is
more than just the physical thing-the land, the bricks, the mortar-it is also the
sum of all the rights and powers incident to ownership of the physcial thing. Prop-
erty is composed of constituent elements and of these elements the right to use the
physical thing to the exclusion of others is the most essential and beneficial. With-
out this right all other elements would be of little value ...."
Id (quoting Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (emphasis
in original)). See also Barker v. Publishers' Paper Co., 78 N.H. 571, 103 A. 757, 758 (1918)
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Further, it is settled that a pension granted by the federal government, as
was the situation in Barbour and McCree, merely confers a right that can
be revised, modified or recalled by subsequent legislation.
24
Because the unvested property interest cannot reasonably be construed
as "property," perhaps the pension is better understood if viewed under
unilateral contract principles rather than as a form of deferred compensa-
tion. 12  If the employee performs in the prescribed manner, a contractual
right automatically arises at the time of vesting. Before that time, there is
no property right in the unaccepted offer.
Had the Barbour court restricted its holding merely to encompass vested
interests, which was the issue presented, its rationale would have been
sound. The extension of the court's holding to embrace unvested pension
interests, however, does not appear supportable.
B. Retroactivity to Encompass Vested Interests
After Barbous holding that pension benefits constituted marital prop-
erty under the equitable distribution statute, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals next turned to the companion case of McCree v. McCree
and considered whether application of the statute to interests that vested
prior to the effective date of the statute was an unconstitutional taking of
property.12 6 The court dismissed the due process argument,"' reasoning
("In its final analysis, the property in anything consists in the use."); G. THOMPSON, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 5, at 31 (J. Grimes ed. 1980) ("The
use of a given object is the most essential and beneficial quality or attribute of property.").
124. E.g., Stouper v. Jones, 284 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In Slouper, a federal em-
ployee was receiving a disability annuity pursuant to the Civil Service Retirement Act of
1930. She was divested of her benefits five years after she began receiving them because of a
subsequent congressional act amending the section under which she derived benefits. Id at
242. The same tentative right to pension benefits is evidenced by § 8333 of the Retirement
Act, which deals with requirements to receive annuities. 5 U.S.C. § 8333 (1982). The his-
tory of § 8333 bears out the fact that Congress substituted the words "eligible for" for "enti-
tled to" in the drafting of the statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 8333 (1982). See also 60 AM. JUR. 2D
Pensions and Retirement Funds § 25 (1964).
125. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-14 (1977);
see also Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. I11. 1955), affid, 234 F.2d 942
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 918 (1956). The unilateral contract theory is more easily
defensible than the deferred compensation theory. If deferred compensation is assumed in a
nonvested setting, a result inconsistent with that theory is manifested. If the interest were
compensation, its withdrawal upon termination would seem to give rise to an action for
deprivation of property. Since the courts have held such a "deprivation" to be nonaction-
able, a theory that views the vesting of a pension as performance of a unilateral contract
appears to explain the interest more accurately. See Swaida v. IBM, 570 F. Supp. 482
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff-d, 728 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1984); supra note 35.
126. McCree, 464 A.2d at 924. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
127. McCree, 464 A.2d at 926.
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that a remedial statute should be construed liberally. 2 8 Furthe-, in con-
struing the pertinent portions of the Civil Service Retirement Act,' 2 9 the
court found that pension benefits derived under the Act did not constitute
constitutionally protected property, but were merely property interests to
the extent that they were protected against arbitrary and irrational acts of
Congress.' 30 The court also found that the equitable distribution statute
fell squarely within the District of Columbia's police power over domestic
relations.' 3' It reasoned that the application of the statute to mitigate eco-
nomic hardship was a valid exercise of that power.' 32 Moreover, since the
statute was to be applied only to distributions after the effective date, the
court held such an application to be prospective in nature. 33
It is well settled that the regulation of the marriage relationship is within
the purview of the state's police power.' 34 Since the state controls the sole
legal method of establishing and dissolving a marriage, the power is jeal-
ously guarded by the principles of federalism. It is, therefore, necessary to
distinguish between a statute divesting a party of a property interest and a
statute prescribing the guidelines for the exercise of the police power. As
the McCree court aptly noted, the statute does not per se affect title to
property. The statute is applied only when the holder of property is before
the court in a divorce proceeding. 35 Furthermore, the litany of considera-
tions set forth for the trial court in the statute ensures against an unreason-
able, arbitrary or capricious distribution, thus satisfying Nebbids
requirements. 136 Finally, the equitable distribution statute was enacted to
128. Id. at 927.
129. See supra note 8.
130. McCree, 464 A.2d at 930. The McCree and Barbour decisions are theoretically in-
consistent. In Barbour, the court determined that pension benefits were divisible property
interests. 464 A.2d at 919. In McCree, however, the court cited case precedent which held
either that there was no property interest in a Civil Service retirement pension, or, at best,
that there was a defensible property interest only to the extent that the legislature had acted
irrationally in promulgating new laws. McCree, 464 A.2d at 930 n.6 (citing Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960) (only limit on congressional modifi-
cation of pension interest is that it may not be patently arbitrary); Stouper v. Jones, 284 F.2d
240 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (interest in government pension may always be modified or removed by
subsequent legislation)).
131. McCree, 464 A.2d at 928. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The state's
power to control the marriage relationship has long been recognized. Eg., Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (exclusive mechanism for legal marriage or divorce is within
the police power of the state); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (state's police power
allows it to create and dissolve marriages).
132. McCree, 464 A.2d at 929.
133. Id. at 926.
134. See supra note 131.
135. McCree, 464 A.2d at 929.
136. See supra notes I, 102 and accompanying text.
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remedy the inequities of its predecessor, which emphasized title to prop-
erty in apportionment upon divorce.' 37 Application of the new statute
only to marriages occurring or to property acquired after the effective date
would cause confusion in property distributions. It also would impede
achievement of the desired statutory goals.'
38
C Valuation
Because the Barbour court held that any potential benefit under a pen-
sion plan was divisible property, 39 it was necessary for the court to discuss
the method of valuation for the purposes of apportioning such property.
In both Barbour and McCree, the trier employed the proportionate-share
method of valuation. Under that method, the portion of pension benefits
attributable to employment during coverture is divided between the parties
in whatever percentage is deemed equitable. 4° Benefits are received by
the nonearning spouse infuturo, when the pension is in pay-status. 4 1 The
advantages of this method are that both parties are provided some degree
of security in retirement and bear equally the risk of forfeiture of the
benefits. ' 4
2
The proportionate-share method, however, is not without its disadvan-
tages. Since the apportionment results in an in futuro distribution, the
court must retain jurisdiction until retirement of the pension-earning
spouse in order to complete the calculation. 43 The allocation may not be
modified, and thus the method is insensitive to future changes regarding
the health and financial positions of the parties. ' Furthermore, the likeli-
hood exists that a pension-earning spouse's income could increase dramat-
137. See supra note 2.
138. McCree, 464 A.2d at 926.
139. Barbour, 464 A.2d at 919-20 n.6.
140. Application of the proportionate-share method to the facts in McCree may aid the
reader's understanding of the mechanics of this method. In McCree, the husband had been
earning the pension for 34.83 years when he retired. This period encompassed all 25.5 years
of his marriage. Thus, the portion of the pension which was attributable to the marriage was
25.5 divided by 34.83, or 73%. This percentage of the pension was then divided between the
parties pursuant to the equitable distribution statute. In McCree, the applicable percentage
was 50%. Thus, the wife was granted 36.5% of all future benefits, an amount which was half
of the portion of the pension attributable to the marriage. McCree, 464 A.2d at 925. This
calculation cannot be completed until retirement because it is necessary to know the total
number of years worked while earning the pension in order to determine the percentage of
those years attributable to the marriage. Barbour, 464 A.2d at 921.
141. See supra note 78.
142. Clemens & Jaffe, Division and Taxation of Retirement Benefits in Dissolution Pro-
ceedings, DIVIDING PROPERTY ON DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 187-88 (1980).
143. Id.
144. H. CLARKE, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 453 (1968).
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ically after the divorce. Under such circumstances, proportionate-share
apportionment would result in a right to after-acquired property in the
nonearning spouse, a result clearly not contemplated by the statute.145
These disadvantages hinder the clean severance of the marital bond, which
is the desired end result of the equitable property division.' 46
Although it approved the proportionate-share method, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals has not precluded other approaches to appor-
tionment and valuation of the pension interest.147 One viable alternative is
the present-value method. 4  This method requires an evaluation of the
current value of the benefits coupled with a present monetary division
based upon the assessment. The present-value method considers the statis-
tical probability of death, disability, termination, inflation and the receipt
of after-acquired property in determining the present value of the expected
future benefit. 14 The advantages of this method are that it allows for the
present transfer of funds to the nonearning spouse, and it assures that af-
ter-acquired property will remain with the proper party. 150
The main disadvantage of the present-value method is that, while the
pension-earning spouse has no right to present enjoyment of the benefits,
the nonearning spouse would be given a present enjoyment. Nonetheless,
the goal of a property division is to fix spousal rights to property. '5' If the
marital blanket is to be torn, the present-value method is the most effective
device for doing so. It should not be used, however, if a present calcula-
tion involves too much uncertainty.'52
A flexible approach to valuation and apportionment is preferred. De-
145. There is no legal justification for allowing the former spouse to participate in the
fruits of property acquired outside of coverture. The court may be awarding a premium to
the nonearning spouse in return for the risk of forfeiture assumed by the nonearning spouse
in an infuturo distribution. Thus, this method of valuation and apportionment would ap-
pear to raise due process concerns. Although property distribution statutes are designed to
maintain the standard of living for both spouses, the spouse receiving support should not be
given a windfall, nor should the property be taken away from the paying spouse to achieve
the statutory objective. See id at 450-52.
146. Id at 450.
147. See Barbour, 464 A.2d at 920 n.6.
148. See Clemens & Jaffee, supra note 142, at 187.
149. Id
150. Id. at 188.
151. See supra note 144.
152. Eg., Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978). It should be
noted that courts must sometimes delve into the realm of speculation when evaluating prop-
erty interests. This may occur, for example, in determining the monetary value of profes-
sional goodwill. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d I (1983) (professional goodwill
of an attorney); Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981) (professional
goodwill of a dentist).
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pending upon the financial positions of the parties, a method should be
tailored to fit the specific facts and circumstances of the case. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals wisely left all valuation options open.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon the entry of a final decree of divorce, the trial courts of the District
of Columbia are vested with the power under the equitable distribution
statute to determine important property rights between the estranged
spouses. In Barbour, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals extended
this power to include pension interests, whether vested or not. This exten-
sion is especially crucial in light of the importance of retirement income
and the reality that a pension account is often the largest single asset in the
marital estate. The holding in Barbour with respect to the specific parties
and their circumstances is unassailable. The court's inclusion of unvested
interests in distributable marital property, however, is arguably in error.
Since an unvested pension interest lacks many of the attributes of prop-
erty, including rights in the pension-earner, it is not consistent with the
notion of property division to include such a tentative interest in the mari-
tal estate. One party cannot expect to have a future interest in which the
other spouse has no right. Furthermore, retention of jurisdiction until the
right becomes vested or payable amounts to a division of property ac-
quired after the divorce.
In McCree, the court rightly upheld the application of the equitable dis-
tribution statute to property acquired before the statute's effective date.
Since there is a strong state interest in the creation and dissolution of mar-
riage, it was within the ambit of the legislature's authority to provide
guidelines for property distribution upon divorce. Because this was a valid
use of the police power, the due process requirements enunciated in
Nebbia were fulfilled. Furthermore, postponement of the statute's applica-
tion would have extended the inequities that the statute seeks to thwart.
In applying the equitable distribution statute to pension interests, the
court of appeals wisely left the door open to various methods of valuation
and apportionment. Flexibility must remain the polestar of the courts in
this regard. In light of the many variables concerning parties to a divorce
action, application of a broad-brush rule of valuation could give rise to
inequitable results.
Charles F Basil
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